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Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s 
conversation with George Selgin. For the full interview, 
go to our Web site: www.richmondfed.org/publications.
To many, the idea that an economy can function 
without a central bank to issue currency or serve as a
lender of last resort will seem bizarre. To economist
George Selgin, the idea is one that needs to be taken
more seriously. 
Selgin, a monetary theorist and historian, has recently
published a book titled Good Money: Birmingham Button
Makers, the Royal Mint, and the Beginnings of Modern
Coinage, 1775-1821. In it, he tells the story of how compe-
tition between private coin makers provided
much-needed currency during a critical time in Great
Britain’s economic history.  
Selgin’s interest in monetary economics was piqued
after he graduated from Drew University in 1979 with
degrees in both economics and zoology. Upon reading a
paper on “free banking” — a system in which private
banks are able to compete with each other in the issuing
of currency and operate without government restric-
tions — Selgin decided to pursue graduate studies at 
New York University under the paper’s author,
Lawrence H. White. After graduating from NYU 
in 1986, Selgin became a leading alternative voice in
monetary economics.
Since 1989, Selgin has been a professor of economics at
the  Terry College of Business at the University of
Georgia. Last summer he took leave from Georgia to
serve as the BB&TProfessor in Free Market Thought at
West Virginia University.
Stephen Slivinski interviewed Selgin on the WVU 
campus on Dec. 11, 2008.
RF: Describe free banking. How does it differ from the
sort of system we have in the United States today? 
Selgin:I use the term to mean laissez-faire banking — bank-
ing without any special government regulations or
restrictions. Like free trade, it’s an ideal concept. It doesn’t
refer to any specific or actual banking system, although
some, like Scotland’s in the early 19th century, came close. 
My own ideal version of free banking would have no spe-
cial requirements for note issuance. Private banks would be
able to issue their own notes on the same basis as they create
demand deposits. They would also be free to open branches
and invest in all kinds of securities. Finally, there wouldn’t be
any sort of implicit or explicit government guarantees, like
deposit insurance. 
RF: Is a commodity standard necessary in your hypoth-
esized free banking environment? Or, to put it another
way, is “fiat money” incompatible with free banking?
Selgin: I think a distinction needs to be made between the
banking regime on the one hand and the monetary base
regime on the other. The way I envision free banking, it does
not rely on a particular base regime. It’s true, as a matter of
history, that if you had free banking from the get-go, you
wouldn’t have central banks and you would almost certainly
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can conceive of free banking in a
modern fiat money setting.
What would make it free is that
the central bank would not have
a monopoly on issuing paper
currency the way central banks
do today almost everywhere. 
A modern proposal for free
banking that doesn’t radically alter the monetary base
regime is one that freezes the monetary base, lets banks
issue any sort of liabilities — including currency — and gets
rid of deposit insurance. The central bank would still main-
tain the monetary base but, in principle, it would just be a
question of making sure it mopped up old central bank notes
and otherwise maintained a fixed stock of reserve credit for
banks to settle with. In that case, you’d have free banking
with a fiat money standard.
The fiat money we currently have is purely the product of
central banks. I think it’s pretty clear that if we never had
central banks, we wouldn’t have fiat money. Instead, we’d
still have commodity money. I don’t think there were any
evolutionary forces at work that would have weaned mone-
tary systems off of established commodity standards,
particularly gold and silver. What would have happened
instead, and what was tending to happen while we still had
those standards, was that the actual need for gold and silver
as money would have fallen, thanks to financial innovations,
to very trivial amounts. 
In the Scottish free banking system, for example, actual
gold coin reserve ratios had already fallen to as low as 1 
percent to 2 percent of the banks’ outstanding demand lia-
bilities by the 1820s. Most of the liabilities were banknotes
back then — deposits weren’t so important. At any rate, the
Scottish banks didn’t need a lot of gold, and the system 
was always finding new ways to economize on it. But the 
ultimate standard was still gold, and I think it would have
remained so in the absence of government interference.
RF: Do you consider fractional reserve banking 
inherently problematic? Does free banking require a
commodity standard so private banks don’t issue too
much currency?
Selgin: The advantages of free banking are distinct from
those of the gold standard or any commodity standard. That
doesn’t mean that I think there is no advantage to a gold
standard. As a matter of history, I think it’s a shame that the
gold standard was dismantled. That dismantling really began
in earnest during World War I, and the gold standard that
was restored afterward was a jury-rigged and, ultimately,
very unstable standard. But one can have a better banking
system under free banking whether there is a gold standard
or not. Fiat money would also work better with free banking
than without it. 
As for fractional reserve banking, I think it’s a wonderful
institution and that it’s crazy to argue that we need to get rid
of it to have a stable monetary
regime. Those self-styled
Austrian economists, mostly fol-
lowers of Murray Rothbard, who
insist on its fraudulent nature or
inherent instability are, frankly,
making poor arguments. I don’t
think the evidence supports
their view, and that they overlook overwhelming proof of
the benefits that fractional reserve banking has brought in
the way of economic development by fostering investment. 
The main thing to keep in mind is that a competitive
bank of issue is one that can issue circulating currency but
has no monopoly on doing so. So it isn’t in a position to print
up its own reserves or to print anything that other banks can
be counted on to treat as reserves. Free banks compete, as it
were, on an even playing field in issuing paper IOUs, which
are basically what banknotes are. They have to redeem those
IOUs on a regular basis: The competition among different
issuers means that their notes will be treated the same way
that checks are treated by banks today. They will be accu-
mulated for a day or so and then sent through the clearing
system for collection. It’s this competition among issuers
that assures that none of them has the power to lead the sys-
tem into a general overexpansion. 
That’s quite unlike the situation you have when you have
a monopoly bank of issue. Even in the presence of a gold
standard, when the privileged banks’ IOUs are themselves
claims to gold, a monopoly bank of issue can expect other
banks to treat its paper notes and its deposit credits, which
are close substitutes, as reserve assets — that is, to treat
them as if they were gold themselves. As a result of that ten-
dency, which exists only because the recipient banks are
deprived of the right to issue their own paper currency, the
less privileged banks become dependent on the monopoly
currency provider and, therefore treat its notes as reserve
money. Now that monopoly bank has the power to generate
more reserves for the whole system and it, in turn, is free 
of the discipline of the clearing mechanism. That’s where 
central banks’ power comes from. This is what allows central
banks to promote a general overexpansion of credit and
inflation. 
What I just described is exactly the sort of thing that
triggered many of the financial crises of the 19th century.
The irony is that people now see these periodic crises, espe-
cially in England, as proving the need for a central bank and
a lender of last resort. Walter Bagehot, on the other hand,
recognized that the boom-and-bust cycles were a product of
a monopoly in currency issuance. 
Today, poor Bagehot must be spinning in his grave,
because your average central bank apologist likes to cite him
as having argued that every country should have its own cen-
tral bank. That is a calumny. Bagehot in fact wrote very
explicitly that he thought it would have been best had there
never been a Bank of England, and if England instead had a
competitive banking system like Scotland’s. In that case
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In recommending that the Bank of England serve as such a
lender, Bagehot wasn’t recommending a solution to prob-
lems inherent in unregulated banking. He was just 
trying to get an inherently flawed Bank of England to behave
itself. 
RF: You’ve already mentioned the Scottish banking sys-
tem of the early 19th century as the best historical
example of a functional free banking system. How did
the Scottish system emerge? 
Selgin: The Scottish system was unique, and that’s because
of politics. After the 1707 Treaty of Union, English authori-
ties did not want Scotland to end up with an institution with
the same power and prestige as the Bank of England. They
more or less insisted that Scotland allow open entry into the
note-issuing business. So the Bank of Scotland, chartered in
1695, was followed by the Royal Bank of Scotland, and then
by other note-issuing banks, until Scotland had a couple of
dozen banks of issue — some big, some small — all compet-
ing. In this way the English quite unintentionally gave
Scotland the world’s most stable, most envied banking 
system, and one far superior to its own. For one thing,
Scotland was relatively free of crises while England was buf-
feted by one crisis after another. 
By the way, the same comparison can be made between
the U.S. banking system and the Canadian banking system in
the last half of the 19th century. Neither was a free banking
system, but the Canadian system was freer in crucial
respects, like allowing banks to issue notes without special
collateral requirements and allowing nationwide branch
banking. This greater freedom made the Canadian banking
system the envy of U.S. commentators at the time. 
RF: Supporters of central banking claim it is superior to
free banking because the central bank can serve as a
lender of last resort in a crisis or a contagion. Are there
characteristics of a free banking environment that
would obviate the need for a lender of last resort? 
Selgin:  The standard view is that banking systems are 
inherently fragile and that they’ll be subject to frequent
bank runs, which with fractional reserve banking will have
very serious consequences. But there’s no good evidence for
this view. 
Two things need to be said. First, truly irrational and ran-
dom runs on banks, out of pure ill-informed panic, are the
exception. In most cases the runs turn out to be based on
relatively accurate information about which banks are insol-
vent and which ones aren’t. In other words, so-called bank
“contagions” tend to be very limited. 
Secondly, the tendency for banking systems to suffer fail-
ures, especially big clusters of failures, depends on the
regulatory environment. Had we had nationwide branch
banking all along in the United States, that alone would have
allowed us to avoid many of the bank failures and problems
we’ve experienced. 
So, the question that has to be asked is not whether 
heavily regulated and structurally weak banking systems in
the past could have benefitted from a lender of last resort.
Perhaps they could have. It’s whether the first-best solution
is to get rid of the regulations that rendered these systems so
artificially fragile in the first place. I don’t think that laissez-
faire or free banking systems, or the closest approximations
we have been able to study, have demonstrated the sort of
fragility that suggests the need for a lender of last resort at
all. In my opinion, a lender of last resort is a second-best
solution to problems caused by misguided regulation of
banking systems. 
Freedom to issue notes is important too. When banks
can’t issue their own notes, well, they need a lender of last
resort to supply them with notes. If we told companies that
manufacture shoes that henceforth they could only make
shoes for left feet, lo and behold, there would be a need for
an “emergency” source of shoes for right feet, which could
be created by establishing a new government agency for the
purpose. Eventually people would say, “Thank goodness for
the Government Shoe Agency. How would anyone be able to
walk otherwise?”
RF: What is the “big problem of small change?” 
Selgin:The big problem of small change — which is the title
of a very good book by Thomas Sargent and François Velde
— refers to the problem of trying to keep smaller denomi-
nation coins circulating alongside larger denomination
coins. Say you have a gold standard. If the mint strikes only
full-bodied gold coins, the smaller denominations will end
up being too tiny. You actually have historical examples of
very tiny coins being issued. But people lost them, and they
were otherwise very inconvenient. So, what else can you do?
You can switch to silver or copper, but then your large
denomination coins would be huge. In practice, no one
metal can be convenient for the full range of denominations
people need. 
Instead, you can have two kinds of metal circulating as
coins — that’s called “bimetallism.” But bimetallism has its
own problem. So long as the mint sticks to a single unit of
account, its coining rates will imply a fixed relative price for
the two metals. But that price is bound eventually to differ
from the world relative price. When it does, the metal that’s
relatively undervalued at the Mint will no longer be offered
to it, and already-existing coins made from it will disappear
from circulation unless they’re badly worn. 
The other solution, and the one that was adopted every-
where, is to use “fiduciary” or “token” coins. Here, the metal
isn’t the source of the coins’ value, which instead rests on a
contrived scarcity or their convertibility into nonfiduciary
money. The trouble with respect to such coins is that they
can be a tempting object for counterfeiters. 
This brings us to the British case. By the 1780s, it was
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estimated that more than 90 percent
of the token copper coins in circula-
tion in Great Britain were fake. And
the real ones were in terrible condi-
tion. Merchants and factory owners
could not get hold of enough decent
coins for making change and paying
workers. Of course, these problems
were  interrelated. The lack of decent
official coins just made it easier for
forgers to market counterfeit coins,
while the extent of the counterfeiting
discouraged the Royal Mint from
producing more legitimate coins. At
last, for several decades starting in
1775, the Mint decided not to pro-
duce any copper coins at all.
Great Britain also used silver coins
as not-so-small small change, but
because Great Britain’s official
bimetallic ration caused silver to be
undervalued at the Royal Mint throughout the 18th century,
no silver was being brought to the Mint to be coined. In
other words, from 1775 onward, the Royal Mint produced
hardly any small change of any kind. 
Now, this was no small matter. Britons needed small silver
and copper coins for all payments under a guinea. Banknotes
didn’t help, because the smallest until 1797 were for five
pounds sterling. This was at a time when the average British
worker was lucky to get 10 shillings, or half of one pound
sterling, per week. So, retail exchange, wage payments — any
transactions among the poor — there was no decent, official
money for any of it. At the same time, the Industrial
Revolution was gearing up. But that revolution depended
crucially on the growth of retail exchange and the expansion
of the factory system. It depended, in other words, on pre-
cisely the sort of exchange media that the government was
no longer supplying. So the small-change shortage threat-
ened to slow down the process of British industrialization.
Yet the British government, instead of trying to fix the
problem, threw its hands up at it, leaving it to private mer-
chants and industrialists to figure out a solution, which they
did, ultimately, by minting and issuing their own coins. 
RF:  Tell me about your research into this historical
episode.
Selgin: This private coinage episode, which is the subject of
my book, was not a small thing. It was not a sideshow. In the
course of 10 years, from 1787 to 1797, private coiners issued
half again as many copper coins — in tons as well as in value
terms — as the Royal Mint had issued throughout the previ-
ous half century. Later, the private coiners would issue silver
coins too. So, for a big chunk of the early Industrial
Revolution, the greatest part of the exchange medium used
to sustain that revolution came from the private sector. 
Very few people know this story.
What’s more, it was only thanks to
lessons learned from Great Britain’s
private coiners, both concerning
how to make coins and how to
administer the coining system, that
the British government and other
governments were finally able to get
their official coinage arrangements
in sufficient order to allow them to
provide for the coinage needs of
industrial economies. Yet govern-
ments still aren’t very good at doing
this. To this day there continue to
be serious coin shortages around
the world. Argentina has been in
the grips of one for years. As long as
we insist on letting government
monopolize coinage, we can expect
such shortages to occur. 
That’s where Sargent and Velde
go wrong in their book. They insist on treating the small-
change problem as being due either to government
authorities not having the right theory about how small
change should be supplied or to their not having the right
equipment with which to implement the theory. They never
really consider what one might call the “public choice” prob-
lems behind change shortages, including the perverse
incentives involved in a bureaucratic and centralized mecha-
nism for supplying coins. If you look carefully at the British
story, the problem there was very clearly not a lack of sound
theory or a lack of adequate equipment. Most of Great
Britain’s private or “commercial” coins were made using
ordinary screw presses and were designed, issued, and
administered by people who never lost a moment’s thought
to any theory, new or otherwise.
RF: How is your book relevant today to monetary policy?
Selgin: The real lesson I want to get across with the book is
that we should take private production and issuance of cir-
culating money more seriously than we do. Through their
unthinking failure to question governments’ coinage “pre-
rogative,” economists set a precedent that made it all too
easy for them to excuse governments’ subsequent monopo-
lization of paper currency, which in turn paved the way to
fiat money, unlimited government guarantees, and the pre-
vailing international monetary chaos. 
I wrote Good Money to challenge the oldest and most fun-
damental belief behind modern governments’ control of
money, by looking at a rare case where government didn’t
issue coins, but the private sector did. Contrary to what 
people assume, the episode suggests that the private sector
alone is fit to coin money. 
RF: Do you see reforms such as currency boards in
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banking?
Selgin: I think the view that currency boards represent a
step toward free banking, perhaps even a big step, is partly
due to the tendency to equate free banking with the lack of
a central bank. I’m not saying that tendency is wrong, but it’s
a little bit misleading. There are ways of getting rid of central
banks that may still leave commercial banks far from free,
and currency boards are an example.
My perspective on currency boards is somewhat differ-
ent. I agree that currency boards and dollarization can help
us move toward free banking, but they do so by eliminating
vested interests that tend to be among the most powerful
opponents of granting greater freedom to banks. Once you
dollarize, for example, whose concern is it domestically to
prevent local banks from issuing their own currency? The
currency profits — the seigniorage — are all going to anoth-
er country. Allowing private institutions to supply currency
would convert at least some of it to domestic consumers’
surplus. There’s no central bank to capture the seigniorage
itself, and the treasury, which might otherwise look to a cen-
tral bank to buy its debt, is now more likely to gain by
encouraging than by standing in the way of currency privati-
zation. So what dollarization and currency boards do is to
get rid of at least some of the bureaucratic support for
restrictions on commercial banks. In that sense, they repre-
sent a movement toward free banking. 
RF: Do you see recent approaches to monetary policies
and Fed actions as contributors to the current eco-
nomic tumult?
Selgin: I agree entirely with those who blame the Fed for
fueling the subprime housing boom by holding interest rates
at such low levels for the early part of this decade. I think
that was a very irresponsible policy. It was so even according
to a conventional sort of Taylor rule, which, in my opinion,
would itself have been too easy. Elsewhere I’ve defended the
view that, in periods of growing productivity, central banks
ought to allow some deflation — that is, monetary policy
ought to be tighter than a standard Taylor rule would have it
be. If you view the Fed’s actual policy in light of this argu-
ment, then the policy was very expansionary. Taylor’s own
simulations suggest that if his rule had been followed, the
housing boom would have been something like two-thirds as
big. If the “productivity norm” I favor had been followed
instead, the boom would have been much smaller still. 
Still, it’s a mistake to blame the Fed alone for the crisis.
And, to some extent, one wants to pity the Fed because the
truth is that central banks cannot get the money supply
right. They are trying to centrally plan it and they do not
have adequate information to go by. They could do better
than they have done, I think, by adopting the right rules. But
they are fundamentally flawed institutions. 
In any event, the Fed provided fuel for the fire, but the
fuel was being directed into the mortgage market, and
specifically into the subprime market, by an array of other
government policies all aimed at increasing homeownership,
especially among less creditworthy persons, and at helping
the construction industry. The story is more complicated
than that, of course, but these are the essential points. 
RF: What do you think are the prospects for achieving
something resembling free banking in the United
States? 
Selgin:Financial innovations tend to take us in the direction
of free banking. Such innovations have already privatized
the greater part of national money stocks, and will keep
doing so in the absence of a wholesale nationalization of
banks. It’s only currency and coin that private firms have
long been prevented from supplying. 
So long as private currency remains illegal, and even if it
doesn’t, further financial innovation will tend to make us less
and less dependent on any sort of paper currency or coins.
Smart cards, debit cards, that sort of thing, have already
made some inroads. And global pressures tend to favor the
loosening of other kinds of bank regulations. There is, how-
ever, one kind of regulation that is growing instead of
retreating and that market forces can’t or won’t resist, name-
ly, government guarantees. Here things have been going the
wrong way for a long time. The spread of deposit insurance
and other explicit guarantees has been obvious enough.
Everyone thinks you can’t possibly have a stable banking sys-
tem without deposit insurance, as if it weren’t the case that
only one country had deposit insurance nationally before
1967 and only two countries for a while after that. I think the
spread of deposit insurance has been very unfortunate, and
that the spread of implicit government guarantees has been
still more unfortunate, because implicit guarantees really
have no limits. 
Thanks to government guarantees, moral hazard is thebig
problem in banking today. We’ve got branch banking in the
United States, finally. We’ve got many good private substi-
tutes for government currency. We’ve gotten rid of other
restrictive regulations like Glass-Steagall. Banks have a lot
of freedom now that they didn’t have in the 1940s and that,
so far as I’m concerned, is a good thing. But, tragically, back
in the 1930s, when the government was busy saddling banks
with regulations that would prove counterproductive, which
it justified using false claims about banks’ excessive risk-tak-
ing, it also saddled banks with deposit insurance, thereby
encouraging them to take excessive risks.  
I don’t know how we’re going to get away from deposit
insurance and guarantees, but as long as we have them and
expand them, we can look forward to bigger and bigger
crises. So to me, the biggest banking reform we need — 
bigger than allowing banks to issue their own notes, bigger
than allowing private mints to spring up — is to roll back
federal guarantees to the banking industry. Unfortunately,
doing that may prove to be an even bigger challenge 
politically than trying to privatize all the world’s paper
money and coin. RF
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